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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship bank share returns have with interest 
rate changes. Specifically, what is the systematic interest rate risk of Australian 
bank share returns. The reasons why bank shares and interest rates possibly 
have a relationship with interest rates are numerous, interrelated and 
complicated. Shares and interest rates generally have a relationship because of 
the comparison made between interest bearing securities and dividend paying 
shares. However, the relationship is compounded with banks, because of their 
exposure to interest rate risk. 
This paper involves two separate analyses. The first part involves attempting 
to measure a bank share's interest rate sensitivity. This will be achieved using a 
two index market model, which will give a measure of a banks systematic 
interest rate risk. The second part attempts to discover the reasons for this 
relationships existence. This involves a survey of banking analysts. 
The two index market model was applied to the ANZ Banking Group (ANZ); 
National Australia Bank (NAB), and; Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC). In 
addition the Australian Bank Accumulation Index (Bank Index) was used to 
gain an indication of the general relationship between bank shares and interest 
rates. 
iii 
j 
The results indicate that the relationship between interest rate changes and a 
shares return is strongest and inverse for NAB. At various times WBC and the 
Bank Index showed a significant relationship. However, this was unstable, and 
varied in both strength and direction over time. At no time was a relationship 
found for the ANZ. 
The survey gave reasons for these results. A general relationship was thought 
to exist mainly because of the comparison made by investors between interest 
bearing securities and dividend paying shares. The analysts did not believe the 
operating aspects of banks played a major role in determining this relationship. 
With rega1d to the differences bank to bank, NAB has a stronger relationship 
because it is not hampered to the same extent as ANZ and WBC are by poor 
asset quality. Therefore, interest rate changes are allowed to play a more 
important role in determining the return on NAB shares. Whereas, for ANZ 
and WBC, their shares return are affected by other factors which are considered 
more important than interest rate changes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This study is concerned with examining the relationship between interest 
rate changes and returns on holding bank shares. Specifically, it will 
attempt to measure a bank's systematic interest rate risk and obtain 
explanations as to why (or why not) the relationship exists. 
Banks are one of many types of financial intermediaries. In Pierson, Bird, 
Brown and Howard (1990), the role of a financial intermediary is described 
as one 
" . . .  to facilitate the flow of funds from savings-surplus units to savings­
deficit units." (p.327) 
Therefore, a bank is a medium between those who save and those who wish 
to borrow. Savers or depositors are rewarded with interest calculated on 
their savings, and borrowers incur costs mainly in the form of interest. 
Consequently, the levels of and changes in interest rates, play a large role in 
determining a bank's revenue and expensesl. 
RBA Bulletin (1990) divided the Australian banking sector into five groups 
under two headings. Firstly, established banks2 which includes major banks 
(e.g. ANZ Banking Group, Westpac Banking Corporation, National 
Australia Bank and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia); state banks (e.g. 
Rural and Industries Bank of Western Australia), and; other established 
1 Banks do have non interest income and operating expenses not associated with interest rates, 
while, the majority of their revenues and expenses are in the form of interest. 
2 Established banks are defined as those which operated prior to 1981. 
banks (e.g. Bank of Queensland Limited, Bank of New Zealand). The second 
heading is new banks, which consists of AustralianMowned banks (e.g. 
Challenge Bank Ltd) and foreign owned banks (e.g. Bankers Trust Australia 
Ltd, Citibank Ltd). It is the major banks upon which this study will 
concentrate. 
The objectives of this study can be summarised as follows : 
(i) To determine if a relationship between interest rate changes and returns 
on Australian major trading banks, as well as the banking sector as a whole, 
exists. 
(ii) Given that a relationship is found to exist, the study would go on to 
consider : 
- how strong, what direction and how stable is this relationship ? 
- is the relationship the same bank to bank ? 
- what possible explanations are there for this relationship. 
To achieve these objectives, the paper involves two separate analyses. 
Firstly, a model is used to gain empirical evidence as to the relationship's 
existence. This model developed by Stone (1974) involves the use of share 
price data and other relevant information. It has been used in a number of 
different studies on banks and other firms within the USA. The results of 
these studies have suggested an inverse relationship exists between interest 
rates and bank shares. 
2 
The second part involves a survey designed to determine why the 
relationship exists in the form suggested by the statistical model. This 
survey was conducted on banking analysts within Australia. The 
questionnaire was designed to obtain the analyst's views of the relationship 
and the reasons they feel it exists. 
Chapter 2 gives an outline on the theory of banks and their relationship 
with interest rates. It shows that interest rates can affect a bank's share by it's 
affect on the operational aspect of a bank, and on the shares comparative 
attractiveness (that is, the return compared to ·"'ther securities). This chapter 
also outlines how banks can measure their interest rate risk. 
Chapter 3 discusses the model to be used to gain empirical evidence as to 
whether or not the relationship exists. This model developed by Stone 
(1974), is a two index model based on the single index Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. This chapter also outlines the findings and criticisms of studies in 
the USA which have used this model. 
Chapter 4 describes the statistical results. While a relationship is found the 
strength varies from bank to bank. Plus, for the individual banks the 
strength, direction and magnitude of the relationship was found to change 
over time. 
Chapter 5 outlines the findings of the survey. The survey reports that 
banking analysts believe bank shares in Australia have a relationship with 
interest rates because of the comparison investors make with other traded 
securities: particularly interest bearing securities, whose returns are linked 
directly to interest rates. As the returns from these securities adjust due to a 
3 
change it;. intere..;t rates, the comparative attractiveness of bank shares also 
changes. Whilst this comparison ran be made for all shares (that is, bank 
and non-bank shares), it appears that this relationship is stronger for the 
major banks in Australia as they have traditionally been considered secure 
and high dividend paying. 
The survey also shows that the relationship differs over time and from bank 
to bank because of the influence other more important factors (e.g. asset 
quality) have in determining the return on banks shares. As these factors, 
become more prominent, the influence interest rates have is lessened. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 a summary of the findings of this p>per are presented 
in the conclusions. All tables are presented in appendices to this paper. 
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Chapter 2 
Interest Rates and Returns on Bank Shares 
There exists a general relationship between the return on shares and interest 
rates. This is because of the comparison that can be made by investors 
between interest bearing securities and dividend paying shares. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, the operations of banks are particularly sensitive 
to interest rates. Therefore, this general relationship between interest rates 
and shares is compounded in the case of bank shares. 
There have been several studies within the USA that have examined the 
impact of interest rate changes on the return derived from holding shares in 
financial institutions3 (e.g. banks, savings and loan associations and life 
insurance companies). The conclusions ot these studies have been divided 
as to whether a relationship exists or not. 
3 Stone (1974), Lloyd and Shick (1977), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Chance and Lane (1980), 
Flannery and James (1984), Booth and Officer (1985), Scott and Peterson (1986) and Brewer 
and Lee (1990). 
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2.1 Interest Rate Risk 
Hempel, Coleman and Simonson (1990), stated 
"Interest rate risk can be defined as the effect of changes in interest rates on 
the value of a single asset, the valu . a portfolio of assets, or the difference 
in the values of a portfolio of assets and a portfolio of liabilities that fund 
the assets. The latter difference is, of course, the net worth of the asset 
owner's balance sheet." (p.26) 
De Lucia, Ferris, Peters and Plummer (1990) have separated interest rate risk 
into three areas : 
(i) direct interest rate risk, 
(ii) indirect interest rate risk, and 
(iii) basis risk. 
Direct interest rate risk is concerned with the quantifiable extent of impacts 
from interest rate changes. This is the risk caused by the mismatch of assets' 
and liabilities' interest reset dates. For example, consider a bank whose 
assets interest rates can only be reset at a later date than it's liabilities. That 
is, the asset side of the balance sheet is fixed, whereas the liability side is 
floating. In this situation, if rates rise the banks earnings will decrease, an.d 
increJse if rates fall. 
Indirect interest rate risk deals with the impact interest rate changes have on 
the behaviour and circumstances pertaining to the banks' customers. 
Interest rate changes can alter the financial plans of it's customers. An 
illustration of changing behaviour is customers refinancing their personal 
loans at lower interest rates when rates have fallen. 
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Additionally, the circumstance of the customers' can change, which in turn 
affects their actions. Interest rate levels usually correspond closely to the 
current economic conditions. It is reasonable to predict that interest rate 
changes could be associated with an increase in the rate of default on loans. 
In this situation, it is of no consequence how matched a banks' deposit/loan 
portfolio is (that is, ifs level of direct interest rate risk), the value will 
change. 
Basis risk is concerned with the exposure to movements in relative interest 
rate levels. With the many different lending/borrowing markets there are 
many different yield curves. The changes in these yield curves are not 
necessarily at the same time, by the same amount and in the same direction. 
A bank could expose itself to basis risk if for example, it borrows 
predominantly from the household sector (via deposits) and then-on lends 
to the corporate sector. 
There are other examples of basis risk which are relevant to Australian 
banks. Firstly, in the area of home loans and the associated interest rates, 
governments can apply considerable pressure. In 1989, interest rates rose 
above 17%, whereas the home loan interest rate did not rise above 17% due 
to political pressure. As was noted by Aveling (1989), banks were paying 
more for the funds used on home loans, than they were receiving. 
Consequently, a bank with a large exposure to home loans in this period 
would have had a decrease in earnings. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested in recent times that banks have been 
able to widen their margins when interest rates decline (Pulman, 1992, p.32). 
Despite some evidence to the contrary (Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, 
7 
1992, p.l), the market may feel that banks do not pass interest savings to 
their customers as quickly as possible. In this case when interest rates 
decline, it may be seen that banks profits will increase. 
So far the discussion has concentrated on how interest rate changes can 
affect the profits and value of banks. It is a logical extension to suggest that 
as banks profit and in turn value is affected by interest rates, the associated 
return from holding a bank share will reflect these changes. 
However, interest rates can also affect the bank's share return without any 
operational or profit consideration. As mentioned, interest bearing 
securities and dividend paying shares compete for investor dollars. 
Therefore, if interest rates change, the shares may become more or less 
attractive to investors. Therefore, it can be seen that interest rate changes 
can affect a bank's share return via the the impact on the banks profits, or its' 
impact on the shares comparative yield. 
There are certain methods available to banks to measure their interest rate 
risk. These are mainly concerned with direct interest rate risk. The 
following section discusses these measures. 
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2.2 Measuring Interest Rate Risk 
A number of methods are available to banks to measure direct interest rate 
risk. In a survey of bank supervisors (RBA Bulletin, July 1990, p.27) three 
methods were quoted : 
(i) analysb of repricing gaps, 
(ii) duration analysis, and 
(iii) simulation analysis. 
The analysis of repricing gaps and duration analysis only measures direct 
interest rate risk. Whereas, the simulation analysis attempts to account for 
other risks and affects, in addition to direct interest rate risk. 
In the repricing gap analysis assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items are 
grouped according to the time it takes for their repricing to respond to 
interest rate changes. Consequently, the banks interest rate exposure is 
measured as a series of 'gaps'; that is, the differences between the assets and 
liabilities of each group. If in a maturity group, assets are greater than 
liabilities, earnings will rise when interest rates increase, and fall if interest 
rates decrease. When liabilities are greater than assets, the opposite holds. 
Repricing gap analysis is only concerned with current cash flows. This 
represents the main limitation of this model. That is, it takes no account of 
the timing of cash flows from principal and interest payments. This is 
opposed to the duration analysis, which is based on the net present value 
methodology. Therefore, it accounts for current and future cash flows, and 
the timing thereof . 
9 
Duration analysis involves measuring the impact changes in interest rates 
have on the value of the deposits and loan portfolio. Duration measures 
the weighted average of the present values of the future cash flows of a 
security (including interest and principal repayments). This gives a measure 
of interest rate sensitivity; the greater the duration measure the greater the 
interest rate sensitivity. 
Banks can measure the direct interest rate exposure via the duration gap, 
which is the duration of assets less the duration of liabilities. When interest 
rates change, the discount rate used in calculating the present value of an 
account changes. Consequently, as the value of individual asset and liability 
accounts change, it is likely the value of the bank will change. 
When using duration the bank forms a view on the direction of interest rate 
changes, and then organises ifs duration gap accordingly. If interest rates 
are predicted to rise, the duration of the liabilities will be set greater than the 
duratiorL of the assets. Alternatively, if interest rates are predicted to fall, the 
duration of the assets will be set greater than the duration of the liabilities. 
In the above drcurnstance if the bank's prediction is correct, the net worth of 
the bank will increase. The actual size of the gap determines the potential 
change in net worth and consequently the amount of risk involved. 
Therefore, if the durations of the assets and liabilities are equal then the 
portfolio is said to be immunised. 
There are a number of limitations associated with the use of duration. 
These are related to the assumptions involved. De Lucia et al (1990) 
discussed a number of these: 
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~when a balance sheet is said to be inununised it is not necessarily matched. 
When a balanced sheet is matched it is virtually riskless because all cash 
receipts are fixed and matched to fixed cash outgoings. A matched portfolio 
is only a special case of an immunised portfolio. The repricing gap analysis 
can distinguish between these two, whereas the duration analysis cannot. 
- immunising by dmation can only provide protection against immediate 
changes in interest rate levels. De Lucia et al (1990) states 
,, the volatility of all debt securities varies with the level of interest rate 
changes, but the rate of this variation differs between securities."(p.187) 
So after an initial change in interest rates, the portfolio will need to be 
adjusted as it is likely that it is no longer immunised Plus, a portfolio that 
is immunised today will not necessarily be immumsed tomorrow. The 
reason for this is that the duration of securities which do not have identical 
cash flows do not change uniformly over time. Consequently, to maintain 
an immunised position requires a constant re-adjustment due to these 
factors. 
- duration is only effective for small changes in interest rates. The reason 
being that duration is a linear approximation for what is actually a 
curvilinear relationship. 
-duration assumes there is a flat yield curve which moves in parallel shifts. 
Plus, it uses only one yield curve to discount payments on all securities. 
This effectively assumes away all basis risk. 
11 
A computer based model of the bank is used in simulation analysis. This 
model attempts to measure the effect interest rate changes will have on the 
net present value, earnings and business in the bank. The main advantage 
is that it is dynamic, and allows various strategies to be tested. Its main 
drawback is typically associated with the assumptions required in the model. 
This section has discussed the various methods used by banks to manage 
their interest rate risk. It can be seen that the models used are limited by 
their simplifying assumptions. Therefore, even if a bank wished to protect 
itself fully from interest rate changes it could not do so perfectly. 
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2.3 Effect interest rates are likely to have on Australian banks st.are returns 
It has been discussed that returns on bank shares are likely to be affected by 
interest rate changes. A question that could be asked is how will interest 
rate changes affect Australian bank shares. More precisely, if interest rates 
for instance fall, will the return on Australia's major bank shares increase or 
decrease? 
The major banks within Australian have traditionally paid relatively high 
dividends with the maximum franking credits. Consequently, these shares 
are normally viewed as secure investments with reasonable returns via 
dividends. Therefore, if interest rates fall the bank shares are likely to be 
more attractive, as the returns on interest bearing securities will have fallen. 
Here the relationship would be described as inverse. 
However, the current poor asset quality• of the ANZ Banking Group (ANZ) 
and the Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC), create difficulties in apply 
this rationale to them. These problems have increased the risk of these 
shares as investments. Plus, the dividends rates for these banks are falling.-
and forecasts are that for most of the 1990's they will be unable to pay 
franked dividends (Pulman, 1992, p.44). Consequently, these shares are no 
longer seen as secure investments and the after tax returns via dividends 
has decreased. 
There seems to exist conjecture as to whether banks are widening their 
margins as interest rates fall, with some studies suggesting they do (Pulman, 
1992) and others proposing the opposite (RBA Bulletin, 1992). If there is a 
perception in the market that banks are lagging interest rate reductions to 
4 This includes all problem loan categories, as well as property exposure. 
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borrowers so as to widen their margins, bank earnings would be seen to 
increase. Consequently, if rates fall the associated share price should rise, 
and again the relationship would be described as inverse. 
However, this scenario .\s mainly short term and falling interest rates can 
have a detrimental effect on bank earnings, as discussed by Pulman (1992). 
Banks experience a structural squeeze on their earnings when interest rates 
fall. This is mainly because banks have more interest earning assets than 
interest bearing liabilities. This surplus exists because two sources of funds 
for banks are equity and the 'free floafS, both of which are effectively interest 
free. PuJman (1992) states, 
"in the short term the negative effect of falling interest rates can be masked 
by the profits the banks make on their portfolios of government securities 
and also by the banks ability to boost earnings by cutting their borrowing 
rates ahead of their lending rates. But these are one-off benefits. If interest 
rates settle at a lower level, which is likely in a low inflation environment, 
then bank profitability will fall" (p.33) 
It is further noted in Pulman (1992) that the National Australian Bank 
(NAB) has the greatest proportion of income earned from ifs interest free 
funds. Therefore of the three major banks, it's income is the most 
influenced from changes in interest rates. However, in terms of total 
earnings ANZ and WBC are more susceptible to falling interest rates. The 
reason being their profitability is so much less than NAB's. 
5 Macrow (1992, p.S) described the free float as the surplus of interest earning assets over 
interest bearing liabilities. This surplus exists because some deposits such as cheque accounts 
do not usually bear interest. 
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Duration-immunisation and the matching or mismatching of assets and 
liabilities do affect a banks operating performance. However, there is little 
data available on internal balance sheet management for these to be 
considered in a detailed way when valuing a share. In addition, with the 
sophistication of the market, banks should be able to hedge or match this 
exposure with a good deal of precision. Therefore, it is unlikely this is 
considered when valuing a bank's share6 . 
The poor asset quality problems mentioned for ANZ and WBC ha·re largely 
been the result of bad debts and non performing loans. This not only has an 
immediate impact on profits due to the bad debt provision, it also has a 
lasting effect on the bank. Firstly, there are non accrual loans, defined by 
Macrow (1992) 
" ... loans on which the accrual of interest is discontinued because the 
collection of principal or interest is doubtful." (p.ll) 
There are also restructured loans, where the bank has renegotiated the terms 
of the loan to improve the chances of recovery. Therefore, there are 
continual costs associated with loans that have gone bad and/ or whose 
recovery is questionable. These loans still must be funded (that is, interest 
payments must still be made) by the bank even though they might not 
recover the loan or are not generating any income. Plus, there are costs 
associated with restructuring the loan terms to those which favour the 
customer. 
6 This is in contrast to US banks who are required to complete quarterly, Forms 10K and Forms 
lOQ. These forms give substantial data with regard to a banks balance sheet. They allow 
some interpretation of their duration exposure and mismatch of assets and liabilities. 
Flannery and James (1984) showed a relationship between a banks interest rate sensitivity 
and the mismatch shown in these forms. This is discussed in more c!~tail in Chapter 3. 
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With these costs, any adverse change in the economy which could increase 
the rate of default on loans is likely to adversely affect a banks share price. 
An increase in interest rates could be seen as a change putting added 
pressure on borrowers and increasing the likelihood of defaults. In this 
situation, the relationship would be inverse, as the share returns should fall 
as interest rates rise. 
There are reasons to suggest that any relationship interest rate changes and 
bank share prices may have is not symmetrical. This may occur when 
interest rates are at either of the extreme ends of their cycle. Interest rate 
margins are proportional to the level of interest rates. Therefore, if interest 
rates are extremely low, the margins will not be as large as when interest 
rates were higher. In this situation, any further drop in interest rates would 
be seen as a further squeeze on margins and the share price should fall. 
Here the relationship is direct. 
Altetnatively, as was discussed earlier, Aveling (1989) discussed that when 
interest rates were extremely high, banks were likely to make losses on 
home loans. Any further increase in interest rates is likely to be associated 
with a further reduction in profits and a fall in the banks share price. If this 
was to occur the relationship would become inverse. 
It can be seen that there are a number of factors that could be involved in 
determining this relationship. The relationship is dependent on the 
particular bank and the current position of the economy. As a result there 
can be no conclusive theoretical answer as to what the relationship will be. 
It is an empirical question that will be resolved by analysing the relevant 
share data over time. This is what this study seeks to do. 
16 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This study involves two areas of analysis. The first of these is a statistical 
model which will be used to determine the interest sensitivity of bank share 
returns. The model developed by Stone (1974) will be used. 
3.1 Description of Stones model 
Stone's model is based on the original single index Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe and Lintner. The CAPM can be viewed 
as representing investment as a choice between placing one's wealth in the 
equity market and the remainder in a riskless asset (cash). Consequently 
investments are seen as a linear combination of the riskless asset and tl.e 
market portfolio. 
Stone expanded this model with the idea that a security's return can be a 
linear function of more than just the two factors mentioned in the CAPM7 . 
Stone (1974) stated, 
" ... introduction of the multiperiod aspect of investment forces one to 
recognise the existence of debt instruments with a series of maturities and 
the concomitant possibility of gains and losses from changes in interest rates 
analogous to the gains and losses from changes in the level of the equity 
market."(p.710) 
This means that the invesbnent decision can be viewed as a choice between 
placing ones wealth in cash, the equity market or the debt market. With the 
introduction of the debt market, the model now indirectly accounts for 
7 This idea has been used by Cohen and Pogue (1967), Sharpe (1970) and in the Arbitrage 
Pridng Theory by Ross (1976) 
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interest rate changes, via the systematic interest rate risk. 
This model is based on the folhwing ; 
Where, 
Ri = return on security j, including dividends and price 
movements. 
Rm = return on the market portfolio, including dividends and price 
movements (referred to from now as the return from the equity 
market). 
Ri = return on the debt security market, including capital gains on 
the security, income from coupon payments and income from the 
reinvestment of coupon receipts (referred to from now as the return 
from the debt market). 
The values for Clj,~mj,~ij and Ei are estimated via regression. They 
have the following meanings: 
O.j = the regression intercept, 
~mj = beta coefficient, measures the responsiveness of security j to 
market movements (Stone (1974) referred to this as systematic 
equity risk), 
~ii = mer ~s responsiveness of security j to debt market 
moveme:tlts (Stone (1974) referred to this as systematic interest rate 
risk). This figure will represent the banks interest rate sensitivity, 
and 
Ei = disturbance term having the usual zero expectations. 
To understand the results that will be obtained by the model it is necessary 
to discuss the relationship between the return from the debt market, the 
systematic interest rate risk and interest rates. FirsUy, as interest rates fall, a 
debt instrument will increase in value. Alternatively, income from the 
reinvestment of coupons will decrease and coupon payments will remain 
unchanged. Of these changes, any increase in value or capital gains, is likely 
to be dominant. When interest rates rise the opposite holds. Consequently, 
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the return from the debt market is likely to have an inverse relationship 
with interest rates. 
The sign of the calculated systematic interest rate risk will give an indication 
of the relationship between the return on the debt market and the particular 
share. If the sign is positive then the shares return will move in the same 
direction as the return on the debt market. This movement is in the 
opposite direction to interest rate changes. 
Stone (1974) felt that failure to acmunt for the interest rate effect could mean 
lost information, instability and noise in the traditional measure of beta. 
Alternatively, if interest rates and the market portfolio are systematically 
related, it can result in bias of the systematic equity risk measure and the 
systematic interest rate measures. 
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3.2 Review of previous studies in this area 
Since it's development the model has been used in various studies. These 
have been carried out in the USA, and their aims have been to ex.qmine the 
interest sensitivity of financial institutions shares. The main differences in 
these studies have usually been in their measure of return fron1 the debt 
market. 
Martin and Keown (1977) tested the model indirectly for the shares of 
financial institutions and public utilities. These two groups were felt to be 
highly sensitive to interest rate changes. It was concluded that similar fcrces 
influencing the returns of the two groups of shares may be related to interest 
rate movements. 
Lloyd and Shick (1977) applied Stone's model to 60 large commercial banks 
and 30 firms included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJ). This study 
used the 'Solomon Brothers Index' as the return from the debt market. This 
was an index of utility issuesB which had Aa or Aaa ratings. 
Prior to the tests being conducted, the return from the debt market was 
adjusted for multicollinearity with the return from the equity market" . The 
results showed that the extra index only marginally increased the models 
explanatory power. It was pointed out that a possible reason for this was 
perhaps the fact that the return from the debt market represented long terms 
to maturity. That is, it represented long term interest rates. Whereas, banks 
and their earnings are likely to be more sensitive to changes in short term 
8 These are issueB from public utilities, such as gas and electrical companies. 
9 The adjustment involved adjusting the bond index in the following ITLNlner : 
R;• = Ri - (Cov (Ri , Rm) I Var ( Rm)) Rm , where Ri is the Solomon Brothers 
index. Ri * is the new index value used in the model. 
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interest rates. 
Lynge and Zumwalt (1980) used the model to test a sample of 57 commercial 
banks and 30 D) firms. Here two indexes were used as proxies for the return 
from the debt market. One represented short term interest rates, and the 
other lcng term interest rates. This test also employed orthogonalizing 
procedures to account for the degree of multicollinearity between the return 
from the debt market and the return from the equity market to. 
The results here were more encouraging than those found by Lloyd et al 
(1977). From the sample of 57 commercial banks, when using long term 
interest rates, there were 42 statistically significant systematic interest rate 
risk values with an average value of 0.704. For short term interest rates, 35 
were statistically significant, with an average value of -14.360. The 
proportion of D) firms with statistically significant systematic interest rate 
risk values was slightly less, with similar coefficient averages. 
The conclusions of Lynge et al (1980) were that bank common stocks returns 
are sensitive to debt returns; more so than industrial common stock returns. 
However, after performing additional tests, it was noted the inclusion of the 
extra index does not reduce the substantial extra-market variation that is not 
explained by the return on the equity market in the single index model. 
That is, the additional explanatory effect of this model compared to the 
single index model is not large. 
10 Gilberto (1985) was critical of Lynge et al (1980) for using this orthogonallzing procedure. 
He believed it would bias results in favour of finding an interest rate effect. That is, the 
systematic interest rate risk would be biased towards being significant. Gilberto also 
mentioned that Flannery et al (1984) used the same method and was equally as critical. The 
method that would not result in any bias was that used by Chance et al (1980). 
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Chance and Lane (1980) investigated whether interest rate changes and 
returns on common stocks of financial institutions did in fact have a 
relationship. Whilst using the model developed by Stone (1974), the 
measure for the return from the debt market was quite different. One of the 
main limitations in results achieved with this model is the 
multicollinearity between the return from the debt market and return from 
the equity market. In order to isolate that portion of the return from the 
debt market which is uncorrelated with the return from the equity market, 
Chance eta! (1980) regressed the following: 
R, =a• + hRm + e, (2) 
Where, Ri = the return from the debt market, 
Rm = the return from the equity market 
ai, bi and €i are the constant, coefficient and residual from the 
regression on equation (2). By definition ei has no correlation with 
the return from the equity marketll . Consequently, the model 
becomes: 
Their results did not find any extra-market interest rate sensitivity in the 
financial institution shares. This was the case whether the return from the 
debt market represented short, intermediate or long term interest rates12 . 
11 As noted previously, Gilberto (1985) stated this method wi11 produce no bias in the 
systematic interest rate risk measure. 
12 Utility shares were included in the study and they exhibited more interest rate 
sensitivity than the shares of the financial institutions. It is believed that utility shares are 
good substitutes for intermediate and long term fixed income securities, and this is a possible 
reason for the relationship. 
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Flannery and James (1984) used Stone's model to examine the relationship 
between the interest sensitivity of a shares return and the maturity 
composition of the firms nominal contracts. Nominal contracts are those 
whose cash flows are fixed in nominal terms. Consequently, a change in 
interest rates will change the value of these contracts, via the change in the 
discount rate used when performing the valuation. 
The nominal contracting hypothesis wa;; proposed, this suggests that the 
variation in the measure of systematic interest rate risk was directly related 
to the structure of the banks balance sheet. That is, the higher the 
proportim1 of the net nominal assets heldt3 , the more sensitive bank shares 
should be to interest rate changes. 
In addition, the maturity mismatch hypothesis was tested. This basically 
stated that the effect a change in interest rates have on the value of a firm's 
share, will vary directly with the difference between the average maturity of 
the firm's nominal assets and liabilities. 
The sample included commercial banks and stock savings and loan 
associations (S&L)I4 . The tests firstly involved calculating the systematic 
interest rate risk for these financial institutions, and using these values for 
additional tests. The systematic interest rate risk values were compared to 
variations in the banks nominal assets and liabilities, and estimated for 
firms who had the same percentage of nominal assets as the commercial 
13 Assets can take the form of either nominal or real/physical assets. The more nominal 
assets compared to real/physical assets, the more exposed a bank will be to interest rates. 
14 Commercial banks and S&L's were chosen because of the large amount of detailed data 
available on their assets and liabilities. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires 
these' financial institutions to complete two returns; Form 10-K and Form 10-Q. These reports 
give a highly detailed report of the maturity matching of assets and liabilities. They are 
completed every quarter. The lack of similar reporting requirements in Australia makes it 
difficult to perform similar tests on Australian banks. 
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banks but a longer maturity. In this situation, Flannery eta! (1984) expected 
the value for the systematic interest rate risk to be higher. 
The results indicated that commercial banks stock returns were highly 
sensitive to interest rate changes (regardless of the term the return from the 
debt market reflected). In addition, the relationship was found to be inverse. 
Evidence was found supporting the maturity mismatch hypothesis. Firstly, 
it was found a.n increase in the maturity of net nominal assets (nominal 
assets less nominal liabilities) was associated with greater interest rate 
sensitivity of stock prices. The S&L had systematic interest rate risks value<; 
twice as large as those for commercial banks. This was expected as S&L' s are 
usually less well hedged than commercial banks. 
Booth and Officer (1985, p.51) attempted to 
" ... reconcile the conflicting findings of previous research regarding this 
issue." 
The conflict mentioned surrounded about the findings of Lynge et a!. (1980), 
who found an interest rate effect, and Chance eta!. (1980) who found no 
relationship. 
This study involved using current interest rate changes. That is, the change 
in interest rates from one period to the next. Here both the three and six 
month Treasury Bill rates were used. Strictly speaking this is not in 
accordance with the specifications of the Stone model. By using interest 
rates, the model is no longer using the return from the debt market. 
Consequently, the results did not give a systematic interest rate risk 
measure. Rather a figure representing the shares sensitivity to direct 
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interest rate changes was found15. 
The orthogonalizing procedure employed was the same as that used by 
Chance eta! (1980). It was found that commercial banks were sensitive to 
interest rate changes, and the relationship was inverse. Further tests 
involved comparing the value of interest rate sensitivity measures for 
commercial banks with other nonfinancial firms. The results found that 
the commercial bank securities were more interest rate sensitive than other 
firms. Additionally, expectations using the ~erm structure of interest rates 
was incorporated into the modell6. It was found that forward expected rates 
as well as forecast errors are important in determining returns on bank 
shares. 
Scott and Peterson (1986) looked at the impact unexpected changes in 
interest rates have on commercial banks, S&L and life insurance 
companies17 . In this paper the return from the debt market was based on 
unexpected interest rate changes. To calculate the unexpected change in 
interest rates, Scott et al (1986) suggested, 
" ... the best estimate of future interest rates is the current rate and actual 
rates follow a random walk around the current rate ... any change in 
15 The systematic interest rate risk value is likened to an interest rate beta. Here, Booth and 
Officer (1985) are not finding a beta measure. Their findings will include both systematic and 
unsystematic interest rate risk. 
16 To calculate the forward rate for a three month Treasury Bill <F3,t+t), the following 
calculations were perfonned : 
F3,ttt = (I+ R6l'2 _ 1 
(I +R3) 
Where R6 is the current yield on a six month Treasury Bill, and R3 is the current yield on a 
three month Treasury Bill. From this the expected change in interest rates <F3,t) is 
calculated as follows: 
F3,t = F3,t+t -R3. 
17 Life insurance companies are usually considered to be well hedged against interest rate 
risk. 
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interest rates is assumed to be unexpected."(p.326) 
Once again this study has used interest rates as opposed to the return on the 
debt market. As has been discussed, this is not in total accordance with the 
model developed by Stone (1974). 
The results found indicated that financial institutions shares are 
significantly affected by changes in interest rates. S&L's measures of interest 
rate sensitivity were twice as large than that for commercial banks and life 
insurance companies. This supports the results of Flannery eta! (1984). In 
addition, the method employed by Chance eta! (1980) of orthogonalizing the 
interest rate measure was used for comparison (due to the findings of 
Gilberta (1985)). The results were virtually the same as the original 
calculations. 
Brewer and Lee (1990) tested Stones model using 45 commercial banks. The 
measure for the return from the debt .market was substituted with 
unanticipated interest rate changes. This wa:; ralculated in the following 
manner : 
~ daily interest rates for the previous year were regressed. The resulting 
coefficients were used to estimate what the interest rates would be for the 
first five days of the new period. These rates were called the expected 
interest rates. 
- the actual interest rates for these five days were deducted from the 
calculated expected interest rates to obtain the unexpected interest rate 
changes. 
- the actual rates for the first five days were then added on to the previous 
years regression calculation, while the first five days of that year were 
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dropped off. Using this new year a regression was performed and new 
coefficients were estimated, after which the next five days expected interest 
rates were calculated. Using these figures unexpected interest rate changes 
for those days were calculated 
- this dropping of five days and adding of five days was continued over the 
total period being analy>ed. 
This type of calculation can be criticised, as it implicitly assumes that future 
interest rates, and the expectations thereof, are a function of previous 
interest rates. In addition, by using the three year Treasury Note rate they 
also are not in complete accordance with the model Stone developed and 
are open to the same criticisms as Booth et al (1985) and Scott et al (1986) 
The results found that the interest rate sensitivity measure was again 
significant and inverse. It was also tested and found in this study that the 
market and interest rate coefficients were not stable over time. This is an 
aspect that other studies have neglected, and forms part of a general 
criticism of all studies mentioned, which will be discussed next. 
Criticisms of these studies are similar. The results of the regressions 
performed in the majority of these studies are shown for the whole period 
being analysed (ranging from three to six years). Brewer et al (1990) derived 
regression results over various subperiods18 within the total period being 
analysed (ranging from four months to two years). Their results found that 
of the banks, 27% experienced a change in interest sensitivity measures and 
60% a change in the systematic equity risk. The other studies have assumed 
either implicitly or explicitly, that the systematic interest rate risk or interest 
18 There were five subperiods chosen. The basis for determining these periods was if they 
were economic upswings or downswings. 
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rate sensitivity coefficients were stable over the period the model was 
regressed. This is in direct conflict with the findings of Brewer et a! (1990). 
In addition, several studies show their results as grouped for the various 
industries (e.g. banks, utilities, S&L, real estate, life insurance companies). 
There is no possibility of comparison between the individual shares within 
the industry group. Apart from Lloyd eta! (1977) and Brewer eta! (1990), 
only an average value for the coefficient is given, and no differences within 
the group are mentioned. It assumes that the coefficient's sign and size is 
virtually the same for all banks. 
The results of Brewer et a! (1990) do show that most measures of interest 
rate sensitivity are negative. However, the size of these values do vary 
greatly19 . If they were to give an average value for the interest sensitivity 
coefficient alone, it would be very misleading. 
The tests to be performed in this paper attempt to account for the criticisms 
of the other studies which have used Stones model. It is to be applied to 
three of Australia's major banks ANZ, NAB and WBCZO. 
Stone's model will be used to gain a systematic interest rate risk value for 
each bank and !-tests will be performed to determine ihe statistical 
significance of these figures. These tests are to be performed over various 
subperiods to identify if the relationship is stable or not. Results are to be 
presented for each bank individually so as to identify changes from bank to 
19 Even though Lloyd et al (1977) listed their results bank by bank, they found little 
relationship in the systematic interest rate risk. Therefore their results do not illustrate this 
point. 
20 The Commonwealth Bank is acknowledged as a major bank, however the associated share 
price data is very limited. Consequently it is not included in the statistical analysis. 
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bank. 
For tho measure of return from the debt market, a bond index will be used. 
However, this will not be subjected to any orthogonalizing procedures. 
While it is acknowledged that this would provide more reliable results, 
time constraints have prevented the use of such techniques. 
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Statistical Analysis 
4.1 Data 
Chapter 4 
The model using equation (1) was regressed over the period 01/10/86 to 
31/03/92, to obtain estimates of Australian banks systematic interest rate 
risk. In doing so the following data was collected for that period, on a 
weekly basis, using the last price or index for that week (where possible) : 
Ri is the return on .individual shares. For this measure individual share 
price data was obtained for the ANZ, NAB and the WBC banks. In addition, 
to gain an insight into the general relationship, the Australian 
Accumulation Index for Banks (Bank Index) was collected. This data was 
obtained from the 'Australian Financial Review'. The individual banlc: 
shares also required associated dividend details and capitalisation changes 
for the period. This was obtained from the 'Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) Data Disk'21. 
Rm is the return on the equity market. Here the All Ordinaries Australian 
Accumulation Index (from the 'Australian Financial Review') and the 
Statex Actuaries Accumulation Index were obtained22. The All Industrial 
Accumulation Index was collected as it was to be used as a proxy for the 
return on the equity market. However, the results found were totally 
different to those found using other proxies. Consequently, this index is not 
considered as it does not appear to be a good proxy for the return on the 
equity market. 
R, is the return on the debt market. This presented somewhat of a problem. 
Initially, the SBC Dominguez Barry Indices, Government Bond Indexes 
were to be used. However, it was discovered that this Index was first 
developed in April 1988. Consequently it was not available for the entire 
period being analysed. An alternative was found in the Commonwealth 
Bank Bond Index23, However, this index was only available on the Tuesday 
of each week. The other data was collected on the last day of the week. 
Whilst it will provide weekly returns, it does limit the precision of the 
study. The Commonwealth Bond index was for AH Series and the 
following maturities : 
~ less than five years, 
~ greater than five years and less than ten years, 
21 Both the 'Australian Financial Review' and the 'ASX Data Disk' were held at the Edith 
Cowan University Churchlands Library . 
22 There were several dates where the Statex Actuaries Accumulation Index was not 
published or available in the 'Australian Financial Review'. To obtain a reliable measure it 
was purchased from the Australian Stock Exchange. 
23 This data was provided by the Commonwealth Bank. 
30 
- greater than ten years, and 
- all maturities. 
A part of the study involved checking the data for errors. The data provided 
from outside sources (Statex Actuaries Accumulation Index, 
Commonwealth Government Bond Index and the dividends and 
capitalisation changes for the shares) was taken as correct. The reason being 
that the institutions providing this data presumably will run their own 
check for errors. The Australian Accumulation Index for the All Ordinaries 
was verified against the 'Personal Investment' publication from the 
Australian Stock Exchange24 . The banks share prices were not able to be 
checked as there are very few publications that contain daily share price data. 
Checks here involved identifying abnormally high or low changes and 
verifying their accuracy. 
Once the data was collected and verified as correct, the weekly returns (and 
'price relatives') were calculated for the banks and indexes. Calculating the 
returns for the shares involved the following : 
Ri,• = I],+ f!tt 
Pit-1 
Where, Rj,t = return on share j for week ending t, 
Pit = price of security j week ending t, adjusted for capitalisation 
changes, 
Pjt-1 = price of security j week ending t- 1, adjusted for capitalisation 
changes, and 
dit = dividends received for the week ending t. 
24 When errors were found the 'Personal Investment' was taken as correct as the 'Australian 
Financial Review' figure is published the following day and is subject to adjustments. The 
'Personal Investment' is published monthly, and would therefore incorporate any adjustments 
in their figures. 
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After obtaining the weekly returns, the price relatives fur each week were 
calculated. This involved the following : 
PR;, = L. <R;,•> 
Where, PR;t = price relative for week ending t, 
Ln = natural logarithm25 . 
The indexes used for the return on the equity market and the return on the 
debt market, underwent a similar calculation : 
Rm,t or Ri,l = lndext 
Indext-1 
Where, !ndext = is the appropriate index for the return on the equity 
market or the return on the debt market for week ending t. 
Indext-1 = is the appropriate index for the return on the equity 
market or the return on the debt market for week ending t-1. 
The index relative was then calculated in the same manner as before : 
IRm o< i, 1 = Ln (Rm,t or Ri,t) 
Where, IRm or i, t = index relative for the return on the equity market or the 
return on the debt market for the week ending t. 
The equation upon which the regression is to be performed effectively 
becomes: 
PR; •. = a; + ~m;IRmt + ~·;IR.. t+ E; (4) 
Once the above had been calculated for all the dependent and independent 
variables, the regressions were performed. There were six periods over 
~The product of the natural logarithm (or log of the exponential) is called the continuously 
compounded rate of return. The nahlrallogarithm helps give a more linea.r relationship 
when calculating the regression. This will assist in reducing the size of the residual and the 
unexplained variance. 
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which the regressions were performed. The first being for the entire period, 
01/10/86 to 31/03/92. 
To determine the stability of the relationship it was decided to perform 
yearly regressions within the entire period. The first of these was from 
01/10/86 to 16/10/87. This period finishes just prior to the 'Stock Market 
Crash' in October 1987. When performing yearly regressions this period was 
avoided to prevent substantial distortions that could result due to the 
abnormality of this period. Consequently, the next four regressions are for 
04/03/88 to 03/03/89; 10/03/89 to 09/03/90; 22/03/90 to 15/03/91, and; 
22/03/91 to 27/03/92. 
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4.2 Results 
The results of the regression are shown in the Tables within Appendix A26 . 
What is evident in these results is that the strength and direction of the 
relationship changed over time for various banks. On various occasions 
NAB, WBC and the Bank Index had statistically significant systematic 
interest rate risk values. The signs of the significant systematic interest rate 
risk values changed over time for WBC and the Bank Index. The following 
gives a summary of the results for the various periods being analysed. 
4.2.1. Period 01/10/86 to 31/03/92 
The only bank to show a significant systematic interest rate risk for the 
entire period was NAB (Table 2). For all combinations of the return on the 
equity market and return on the debt market a significant and positive 
systematic interest rate risk value was fmmd. When the shorter terms are 
used for the debt market index (terms to five years and between five and ten 
years) the systematic interest rate risk values are larger and the statistical 
significance is stronger. For the ANZ, WBC and the Bank Index (tables I, 3 
and 4) there is no real significance in the systematic interest rate risk values. 
The Bank Index does give t-tests scores which are greater than one, however 
none are significant. 
The R squared scores are highest for the Bank Index. They suggest that the 
model explains around 60% of a banks share returns. The WBC is the best 
individual bank with scores around 50%. Both the NAB and ANZ have 
scores in the 40% range. 
26 In these tables the constant (n) is not shown as it adds little to the findings of this paper. 
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4.2.2Period 01/10/86 to 16/10/87 
As was the case for the whole period, NAB shares showed a significant and 
positive value for the systematic interest rate risk (Table 6). The systematic 
interest rate risk values are greater and more significant when the return on 
the debt market is short term. The ANZ, WBC and the Bank Index 
systematic interest rate risk values show no significance (Tables 5, 7 and 8). 
The Banks Index had systematic interest rate risk values with t-test scores 
greater than one. However, no statistical significance was shown. 
The bank index and NAB have the highest R squared scores. They both 
range from 40 to 44%. Whereas, ANZ and WBC fall in the low to mid 30% 
range. 
4.2.3. Period 04/03/88 to 03/03/89 
Except when the return on the debt market was 'All Maturities', WBC (Table 
11) and the Bank Index (Table 12) had statistically significant systematic 
interest rate risk values. For both, the values were negative, and larger 
when the return on the debt market was the shorter term. The ANZ and 
NAB (Tables 9 and 10) had no significance in their systematic interest rate 
risk values. The Bank Index had the highest R squared values, with scores 
around 60%. Next was WBC with scores in the low 50% range, ANZ and 
NAB with scores of 40% or lower. 
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4.2.4 Period 10/03/89 to 09/03/90 
WBC (Table 15) had significant values for systematic interest rate risk when 
the return on the debt market reflected shorter term interest rates. On these 
occasions the signs of these coefficients were positive, which meant the 
direction of the relationship had changed from the previous period. For the 
ANZ, NAB and '•he Bank Index (Tables 13, 14 and 16 respectively) there was 
no significant relationship. In this period the R squared scores were lower 
than for previous periods (it seems as though there was extra 'noise' in this 
period). The Bank Index was generally around 40% (with one isolated score 
of 69%), and the rest were lower (ANZ and NAB having the lowest scores of 
26%). 
4.2.5. Period 16/03/90 to 15/03/91 
In this period none of the banks or the Bank Index had any significant 
systematic interest rate risk values (Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20). The Bank Index 
came closest as it had t-test scores of greater than one when the return on 
the debt market was for longer terms (greater than ten years). The R squared 
scores for the banks were generally lower, usually around the 30% range. 
The Bank Index however, had scores ranging from 55 to 63%. 
4.2.6. Period 22/03/91 to 27/03/92 
NAB had significant systematic interest rate risk values for all combinations 
of the return from the equity market and the return from the debt market 
(Table 22). When the return on the debt market was for the shorter terms, 
the systematic interest rate risk had higher values. Plus, for all maturities 
the systematic interest rate risk values were positive. The ANZ, WBC and 
the Bank Index (Tables 21, 23 and 24) had !-test scores for the systematic 
interest rate risk greater than one, but only one score for the Bank Index was 
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significant. Once again the R squared scores for the Bank Index was highest 
(up to 63%), with NAB having scores in the high 40% range, WBC 32 to 42% 
and ANZ around 33%. 
4.2.7 Summary of Results 
Table 25 gives a summary of the significant systematic interest rate risk 
values found and illustrates several points. Firstly, that the systematic 
interest rate risk measures are larger and more significant when the return 
on the debt market index represents the shortest term (up to 5 years). This is 
shown by the higher number and larger average values of significant 
systematic interest rate risk. This suggests that the relationship is stronger 
and banks are more sensitive to interest rates that are short term. 
Table 25 also shows that WBC and the Bank Index, have both positive and 
negative systematic interest rate risk values. When examining the 
individual tables it is revealed that the direction of the relationship changes 
over time. The size of the actual systematic interest rate risk measures have 
also changed over time (for the debt market index up to 5 years, NAB's 
measure ranges from 2.309 to 1.218; WBC's 2.119 to -2.294, and; Bank Index 
1.962 to -1.853). Additionally, the significance of the relationship varied over 
time (NAB, WBC and the Bank Index had periods where the relationship 
was statistically significant, followed by periods where it was not). These 
points prevent strong evidence that the relationship is not stable over time. 
It appears that the relationship is stronger for NAB than the other banks. 
They had more occasions throughout this period where the systematic 
interest rate risk was significant. Plus, the direction did not change, all 
systematic interest rate risk values were positive. This means that the 
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relationship of NAB to the changes in interest rates is inverse (see 
discussion in Chapter 3.1). 
Other points to note are the strong significance found in the systematic 
equity risk, all regressions performed found significance here at the 1% 
level; the ANZ at no stage had any statistical significance in the systematic 
interest rate risk measure, and; the Bank Index had the highest R squared 
scores, with the results suggesting that the model on average explained 
around 55% of it's total return. 
However, the results achieved, and therefore any conclusions made, should 
take account of the following qualification. The results found suggest that 
their was a high degree of multicollinearity between the return on the 
equity market and the return on the debt market. This can increase standard 
errors in the coefficients (systematic equity risk and systematic interest rate 
risk). Additionally, it can also produce errors in the associated t-test statistics 
scores. 
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4.3 Comparison with other studies 
The results found in this study's use of Stone's model can be summarised as 
follows: 
(i) that a relationship between interest rate changes and 
returns on bank shares does exist, 
(ii) the relationship found is not stable since the direction, 
strength and sensitivity implied by the results all change 
over time, and 
(iii) the relationship is stronger and more sensitive when 
the return used for the debt market reflects short term 
interest rates. 
These results can be compared with the studies performed in the USA. 
Firstly, that some relationship was found in this study is in accordance with 
the findings of Lynge et al (1980), Flannery et al (1984), Booth et al (1985), 
Scott eta! (1986) and Brewer et al (1990). The findings that the systematic 
interest rate risk was not stable over time also agree with the results of 
Brewer et a! (1990). 
The majority of the previous studies that found the relationship to exist, 
foWld it to be an inverse relationship. This was not always the case in this 
study. The systematic interest rate risk values for the WBC and the Bank 
Index varied between positive and negative. However, NAB's systematic 
interest rate risk value was always positive, which indicates an inverse 
relationship with interest rates (as was discussed in chapter 3.1). 
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The possible reasons as to why NAB exhibits a strong relationship is likely 
to revolve around the view that in comparison to ANZ and WBC, NAB's 
financial position is sound. Consequently, the relationship is not clouded 
or obstructed by other issues which are considered more important. Given 
that ANZ's and WBC's share price is currently dominated by questions of 
asset quality and future dividend levels, the impact of changes in interest 
rates is likely to be relatively minor. 
Therefore, it is likely the relationship shown in Australia is scmilar to that 
shown in the USA. However, it is hampered by other issues which do not 
allow the true relationship to be reflected in all the banks share returns. 
This study found when the return on the debt market is calculated on a 
short term basis it gives a stronger and more sensitive relationship, as was 
suggested to be the case by Lloyd eta! (1977). Of the studies that incorporated 
different terms to maturity for the return on the debt market, Lynge et a! 
(1980) and Flannery et al (1984) found that shorter term maturities gave 
larger systematic interest rate risk values. Howe\ler, they did not necessarily 
have greater statistical significance. 
It is difficult to compare the results of these studies to the results generated 
here. There are several major differences between the studies: 
(i) As was noted by Hempel (1990), the USA in 1987 had 14282 insured 
commercial banks. Of these 7365 were unit banks27 and 6917 operated 
under a branch system. Consequently, the USA banking system is quite 
different to Australia's. Here four banks dominate the banking sector28 
27 Unit banks are 'one office' banks. The large number of these banks is a legacy of the USA's 
banking regulation. 
28 RBA Bulletin (1990) showed that the four major banks in 1989 held 66.1% of Banks 
Aggregate Australian Balance Sheet. 
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(ANZ, NAB, WBC and the Commonwealth Bank) and all operate under a 
branch system. 
(ii) As discussed in Chapter 3, previous studies orthogonalized the return on 
debt market, to remove the multicollinearity between this and the return 
on the equity market. This study did not adjust the return on the debt 
market in any way>9 (see chapter 3, page 24 for explanation of why 
orthogonalizing procedures were not used). 
(iii) The time periods being analysed each have their owr peculiarities, 
which may affect the relationship. This can be seen by a review of some of 
the events that have occurred during the period ~his study examined 
(01/10/86 to 31/03/92). There were several significant economic events, 
such as the continued deregulation of the financial system. Tax changes in 
the form of the capital gains tax legislation30 and the imputation tax system 
for company dividends. There were distinct changes within the economic 
cycle, with a property boom, recession and periods of extremely high and 
low interest rates. Finally, on a global scale, the 'Gulf War' and radical 
changes within Eastern Europe. It is likely that the othe·; studies had their 
own peculiarities in the period they chose to examine. 
Therefore, only general comparisons can be made. However it appears that 
there are common results between the studies. These are that a relationship 
does exist; is predominantly inverse; is more sensitive to short term 
interest rates, and; is not stable over time. 
29 Consequently, the tests in this paper experienced a high degree of multicollinearity 
between the return on the debt market and the return on the equity market. 
30 The capital gains tax legislation became effective in September, 1985, which is just prior to 
the period this paper analysed. 
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Chapter 5 
Survey of Banking Analysts 
The discussion in the earlier chapter as to why interest rate changes should 
affect a bank's share return revealed various factors which could determine 
this relationship. For example interest rates can affect the banks operations 
and profitability, and can also alter the comparative attractiveness of bank 
shares. Consequently, this paper attempts to gain some understanding as to 
what factors actually do affect this relationship. 
In connection therewith, a survey was conducted of stockbroking analysts 
who specialised in banks, to determine their understanding of the 
relationship. This group was selected for their role as opinion leaders in the 
area of bank shares. It is likely their view of the relationship will be a 
representation of the market's. In particular, it was hoped this survey would 
give reasons as to why the evidence here suggests that : 
- the relationship is inverse and stronger for NAB, 
- the relationship changes overtime for WBC and the Bank Index, and 
- there is virtually no relationship for the ANZ. 
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5.1 Research Technique 
As mentioned the research technique to be employed here is a survey via a 
questionnaire. This survey had the following objectives which were 
incorporated into the questionnaire design : 
(i) To determine if bank analysts believe a general 
relationship between bank shares and interest rates 
exists; and if so, the strength, direction and stability of 
this relationship. 
(ii) To identify the main factors affecting this 
relationship. In particular, do certain operational 
aspects of the bank, such as duration, interest rate 
margins and rate of default play a role in Ibis 
relationship. 
(iii) To determine how this general relationship 
compares to the relationship for individual banks. If it 
differs between banks, what peculiarities exist for that 
bank which make it different. 
The questionnaire, shown in Appendix B, was designed also to allow the 
responses to be tabulated and compared. Consequently, most responses had 
a closed ended response format (e.g. scales, yes or no, direct or inverse). 
Additionally, the responses also allowed an open ended response, giving 
the bank analyst an opportunity to make comments if they wished3I . 
31 The closed ended responses were applied mainly to allow comparisons to be readily made 
between banking analysts. The open ended responses were applied to determine what factors 
made the relationship exist. 
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The intention was to interview all the recognised banking analysts in 
Australia. The list of banking analysts used was based on a list of 
stockbrokers to which Challenge Bank routinely communicated 
information on its performance. Discussion with certain banking analysts 
and representatives of other banks confirmed that the list contained the 
recognised banking analysts in the market. 
This list contained twenty names, of which fifteen were eventually 
interviewed32. The interviews were conducted by phone as all the analysts 
are based in either Melbourne or Sydney. Normally the questionnaire was 
faxed to the analyst before the interview was held33 . 
32 Two analysts refused to take part in the interview and three were unable to be contacted. 
33 If the analyst wanted to have the 'interview immediately without waiting for the 
questionnaire, this was accommodated. 
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5.2 Results of Survey 
The results of the questionnaire are shown in tite Tables in Appendix C. 
The first point to note is that all analysts agreed that a relationship did exist 
(Table 26). However, most analysts qualified this response by saying that 
they did not feel the relationship was strong. This is shown in Table 27, 
where the majority of responses felt that interest rates only have some effect 
on bank shares return. The majority of responses also felt the relationship 
was unstable (Table 29). 
The driving force in this relationship was thought to be the comparison of 
bank shares to other securities. A common example given was that as 
interest rates fell, the bank shares become more attractive (as they 
traditionally have high yielding franked dividends). 
In addition, a large proportion of analysts discussed the perception that as 
interest rates fall, bank margins widen and this will increase bank earnings. 
Therefore, the associated bank share will become more attractive. Most 
analysts emphasised that this widening of margins was a perception, as 
opposed to fact. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a recent study has produced 
evidence that banks de not widen their margins (Reserve bank of Australia 
Bulletin, 1992). These factors serve to illustrate why the consensus of 
opinion was that the relationship is inverse (Table 28). 
The mojnrity of analysts felt that the relationship was driven more by yield 
considerations than any operational or functional aspect of the bank. Bank 
shares are considered a 'quasi fixed interest security', and the impact of any 
change in interest rates tends to be short term. 
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The lack of the significance of the bank's operations in determining this 
relationship was shown in the responses as to the importance of duration 
' 
and maturity effects (Tables 30 and 31). For duration the majority of 
responses tended to classify it as less than important, and maturity effects 
was only slightly better. The reasons suggested for this was that 'these 
things are usually well hedged'; it is not really known in the market as to 
'what is happening here', and; internal balance sheet management is not 
considered when valuing a bank share. 
This is in contrast to the findings of Flannery et a! (1984), who found that 
the size of certain USA banks' systematic interest rate risk value was related 
to the mismatch or duration of their balance sheet. The main reason for 
this was that banks are required to complete Forms !OK and lOQ quarterly. 
As discussed previously, this allows investors to analyse a banks position 
and exposure to interest rate changes in great detail. This type of data is not 
provided publicly by Australian banks, and investors are usually 
uninformed in this area. 
The lack of significance in the bank's operations in driving this relationship 
is not reflected in the responses as to the importance of rate of default on 
loans and interest rate margins between assets and liabilities. Tables 32 and 
33 suggest that these two are seen as very important in determining this 
relationship. However, the analysts comments do clarify this somewhat. 
The rate of default is thought to be influenced by other factors, such as the 
economy. Even though high interest rates will have been one of a number 
of factors that have caused the large amount of bad debts experienced by 
several banks recently, there is a lag. That is, if rates have stayed high for a 
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sustained period, the subsequent bad debts, if they are to occur, will do so 
after a certain period. 
The margins have a direct profit affect. Rates only need change for banks to 
alter their margins. They do not necessarily have to decrease for margins to 
widen. However, it was noted that this factor is not as important as the 
comparative aspect of securities. 
It was repeatedly mentioned by analysts surveyed that returns on bank 
shares are influenced by factors more important than interest rates. The 
factors mentioned were ; 
-asset quality (currently extremely important), 
w management, 
-the economy, and 
- the bank's dividends and associated franking levels. 
These are the factors which make the relationship unstable. As these other 
factors change and become more or less prominent in determining bank 
share returns, the effect interest rates have also adjusts. For example, if asset 
quality becomes more prominent, interest rates become less prominent. 
With reference to individual banks, most analysts agreed that the general 
relationship could not be applied unilaterally to all banks (Table 34). That is, 
some banks have their own peculiarities which affects their shares 
relationship with interest rates. The general theme of the comments 
seemed to suggest that the relationship differed in strength from bank to 
bank, not in direction. 
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Table 35 shows the banks for which the general relationship is thought to be 
different. It can be seen that ten analysts felt at least ANZ & WBC's 
relationship changed (if you add 'ANZ & WBC' to 'All Banks'), whereas 
eight felt at least NAB's relationship change. When examining Tables 35, 
36, 37 and 38 the following is revealed: 
- of the ten who felt ANZ & WBC's relationship changed, seven saw it as 
weaker (Tables 36 and 38), and 
- of the eight who saw NAB's relationship change, five felt it was stronger 
and two more stable (Table 37). 
The reasons suggested for this is related to the fact that the effect of interest 
rate changes on bank shares is dictated by the importance of other factors. In 
recent times both the ANZ and WBC have been hampered by poor asset 
quality. This issue alone tends to dominate the return on these shares. As a 
result any effect interest rates may have is negated. A common comment 
throughout the survey was 'for ANZ and WBC shares it does not really 
matter what happens with interest rates'34. 
In contrast to ANZ and WBC, NAB is not hampered to the same extent by 
problems of poor asset quality. Consequently interest rates are allowed to 
play a more prominent role in determining this shares return35. One 
broker summed up the distinction by saying 'usually it can be determined 
where interest rates are going, the question is do you know where the banks 
profits are going: NAB yes, ANZ and WBC no'. 
34 When discussing asset quality it encompasses a wide range of factors. Drummond (1991) 
said it includes the current level of substandard loans, high leverage transactions, less 
developed countries exposure, finance company receivables, the split between retail and 
wholesale exposures, commercial property and the known major corporate exposures. Poor 
asset quality can be linked to most of ANZ and WBC's problems. It has reduced their profits 
and dividends, and has created a great deal of doubt over their earning capacity. 
35 One broker gave an alternative view. He felt because NAB was doing so well interest rates 
did not have a large role to play. 'NAB are making profits regardless of interest rates'. 
Other comments by the analysts were: 
- the period being analysed in this study was an extraordinary period in 
Australia's economic history. There have been periods of extremely high 
and extremely low interest rates; property boom; recession; introduction of 
the imputation system for dividends, and; loan and property problems. All 
these factors will tend to negate any affect interest rates may have on bank 
shares36. 
- several analysts suggested that the relationship would be stronger for 
second tier banks (e.g. Bank of Melbourne, Metway Bank, Advance Bank 
Australia, and Challenge Bank). These banks have a greater exposure to the 
housing sector and therefore should have a stronger relationship with 
interest rate changes37 . One analyst suggested that they should resemble 
'little NAB's'. 
- the relationship is not as clear when interest rates are at either of the 
extreme ends of the cycle. At present, Australia has very low interest rates, 
and it is hard for banks to maintain the same margins here that they had 
when interest rates were higher (4% margin with rates at 6% ?). 
Alternatively, at the other end of the cycle when interest rates were at 18%, 
banks were making losses on home loans as they could not charge any 
higher than 17% (Aveling, 1989). 
36 In statistical terms this could be described as creating a lot of noise in the model used 
(increase the value given to e). 
37 The RBA Bulletin (1990) specified these banks as 'New Australian Owned Banks' . In 
1989, of this group's total assets, 35% was 1ending to the household sector'. The average for 
the total banking sector was 16.8% 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to find the relationship that Australian 
banks share returns have with interest rate changes, and then explain why 
the relationship exists. To this end the paper involved the following: 
(i) Performing statistical analysis using a two index 
model developed by Stone (1974), to gain empirical 
evidence as to the relationship between the major 
Australian banks share returns and interest rate 
changes. 
(ii) Conducting a survey of the top banking analysts 
within Australia, and determining how they see the 
relationship, and why they believe it exists. 
In this final chapter, a brief review is provided of the theory as to why bank 
shares and interest rates are related, and of the discoveries of previous 
studies in the USA. Finally, a summary of the findings of this study is 
presented. 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that a banks share return can be affected by 
changes in interest rates in two ways. Firstly, interest rate changes can affect 
the profitability and value of a bank through its operational functions. 
Therefore, as the profitability and value of a bank changes, the associated 
share value should reflect this. Secondly, as interest rates change the return 
on interest bearing securities adjusts. Depending on the change this will 
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affect the relative attractiveness of the bank share. This is especially the case 
as the major banks have traditionally been regarded as having secure shares 
paying a reasonable dividend. Howevzr, as was discussed this has changed 
considerably for ANZ and WBC. 
In Chapter 3 the statistical model to be used in this paper was discussed. 
This model was used to gain empirical evidence as to the existence of a 
relationship between the return on Australia's major banks shares and 
interest rate changes. It has been used several times on banks and other 
share issues in the USA. While there have been conflicting results, the 
ma~-,rity of the evidence suggests a relationship does exist. This 
relationship was found to be inverse and unstable over time. 
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6.1 Summary of Findings 
Chapter 4 discussed the statistical analysis and its results. Tests were carried 
out for the three major banks (ANZ, NAB and WBC) and the the Bank 
Index. The results can be summarised as follows : 
- for NAB a significant positive relationship between 
the return on it's share and the return on the debt 
market was discovered. This implies that NAB shares 
have an inverse relationship with interest rates, 
- for WBC and the Bank Index, a relationship was found 
but it appeared to be substantially weaker than that for 
NAB. The relationship's direction and significance 
changed from period to period, 
- for the ANZ no relationship was found, 
-when a relationship was found, it was stronger when 
the return from the debt market was representing 
shorter terms to maturity. This suggests that bank share 
returns are more sensitive to short term interest rates, 
- from the R squared scores, it appears the model 
explained on average around forty percent of the shares 
returns. The bank index gave the highest scores here 
with an average around 55% (Table 25), and 
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- the model exhibited a high degree of multicollinearity 
between the return on the debt market and the return 
on the equity market. This places doubt over the 
validity of results. 
In comparison to the studies performed in the USA, there were some 
similarities. However, this appeared to be mainly associated with the results 
found for NAB. That is, at times the relationship is significant and inverse 
to interest rate changes. 
In Chapter 5, a description is given of the survey performed. It was designed 
to determine how the market sees the relationship and why it exists. 
Therefore, fifteen of the top banking analyst:; within Australia were 
interviewed. These analysts saw the general relationship as existing, and in 
particular the relationship is, 
- inverse with interest rate changes - when interest rates fall, the return on 
interest bearing securities falls, plus there is a perception that banks margins 
are widened. This makes the bank shares comparatively more attractive, in 
addition to being seen as more profitable, 
- unstable - other factors play a more important role than interest rates in 
determining a bank shares return. Things such as asset quality outweigh 
any effect interest rates may have. Therefore, as these other factors become 
more or less prominent, the affect interest rates have will adjust in the 
opposite direction. 
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-stronger for NAB, and weaker for ANZ and WBC - as other factors 
determine the significance of the role played by interest rates in determining 
a bank's share return, this accounts for the differing strengths in the 
relationship bank to bank. For the ANZ and WBC, asset quality is a major 
problem. Therefore, it does not really matter how interest rates change, the 
problems with their assets outweighs any affect interest rates may have. 
Alternatively, NAB is not hampered by these problems and has a much 
cleaner relationship. 
Finally, there appears to be further scope and adjustment for study within 
this area. Several analysts in the survey suggested using second tier banks 
('New Australian Owned Banks') in the analysis. They believe that a 
stronger relationship would be shown because of their exposure to the 
housing market. In addition, the Commonwealth bank in many respects 
can be considered similar to NAB, as it does not have the asset quality or 
dividend problems that the ANZ and WBC have. Therefore, it is likely to 
show a similar relationship with interest rates that NAB showed. 
Due to the high degree of multicollinearity found in this study, further 
studies should adjust the return on the debt market with orthogonalizing 
procedures. Specifically, the procedure outlined by Chance et al (1980), 
which was found by Gilberta (1985) to provide no bias in the results. Plus, 
returns from the debt market which represent shorter interest rate terms 
than five years should be employed. Results here suggest that the systematic 
interest rate risk will be greater for interest rates of shorter terms. It is 
believed that incorporating the above adjustments will provide more 
conclusive and meaningful results. 
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APPENDIX A 
Regression Results 
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TABLE 1 
Results of Regression Tests for ANZ for the Period 01/10/86 to 31/03/92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5YEARS 0.855 -0.174 0.409 
ORDINARIES (13.999)••• (-0.351) 
5 <YEARS> 10 0.856 -0.035 0.409 
(13.965)••• (-0.142) 
> lOYEARS 0.859 -0.141 0.411 
(14.041)••• (-0.856) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.855 0.045 0.410 
(14.013)••• (0.674) 
STATEX < 5YEARS 0.830 -0.262 0.392 
(13.507)••• (-0.520) 
5<YEARS> 10 0.831 ..Q.058 0.392 
(13.466)••• (-0.232) 
> lOYEARS 0.834 ..Q.138 0.393 
(13.537)••• (-0.823) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.830 0.045 0.393 
(13.511)••• (0.671) 
......... p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 2 
Results of Regression Tests for NAB for the Period 01/10/86 to 31/03/92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUI1Y DEBT VALUE 
ALL < SYEARS 0.750 1.296 0.409 
ORDINARIES (13.709)* ..... (2.910)"" .... 
5<YEARS> 10 0.737 0.620 0.408 
(13.408)* .... (2.819)*** 
> IOYEARS 0.741 0.295 0.400 
(13.392) ........ (1.979)** 
ALL MATURffiES 0.750 0.127 0.401 
(13.607),.,. ... (2.120)** 
STATEX <5YEARS 0.741 1.218 0.406 
(13.612)* ..... (2.728) ....... 
5<YEARS> 10 0.729 0.596 0.405 
(13.331),.... .. (2.700)""** 
> IOYEARS 0.734 0.295 0.398 
(13.354) ........ (1.976) ...... 
ALL MATURITIES 0.743 0.128 0.400 
(13.571)"""* (2.126)** 
*** p < 0.01 
** 0.01 < p < 0.05 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE3 
Results of Regression Tests for WBC for the Period 01/10/86 to 31/03/92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
' EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE I 
ALL <5YEARS 0.981 0.206 0.516 
ORDINARIES (17.367)*•• (0.449) 
5< YEARS> 10 0.980 0.009 0.516 
(17.298) .... "' (0.042) 
> 10YEARS 0.981 -0.011 0.516 
(17.312)'" (-0.070) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.980 -0.049 0.517 
(17.374)'" (-0.802) 
STATEX <5YEARS 0.949 0.106 0.491 
(16.519),.,. ... (0.225) 
5<YEARS> 10 0.949 .0.016 0.491 
(16.460)'" (-0.068) 
> 10YEARS 0.949 -0.006 0.491 
(16.474)'" (-0.040) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.949 -0.049 0.492 
(16.533)'" (-0.775) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE4 
Results of Regression Tests for Bsmk Accumulation Index for the Period 
01LlOL86 to 31L03L92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQU11Y DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 0.857 0.390 0.670 
ORDINARIES (21.789) ....... (1.217) 
5<YEARS> 10 0.853 0.185 0.627 
(21.612) ....... (1.169) 
> 10YEARS 0.855 0.058 0.626 
(21.630) ... ..,. (0.542) 
ALL MA TURITIIiS 0.857 0.023 0.626 
(21.737)"'*• (0.529) 
STATEX <5YEARS 0.835 0.302 0.604 
(20.762) ...... (0.915) 
5<YEARS > 10 0.832 0.161 0.604 
(20.603)**"" (0.988) 
> 10YEARS 0.833 0.060 0.604 
(20.645)**"" (0.552) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.835 0.023 0.604 
(20.750),.... .. (0.524) 
"'** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Regression Tests for ANZ for the Period 01l!Ol86 to 16LJ0l87 
RIITURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUI1Y MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUI1Y DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5 YEARS 0.825 0.339 0.340 
ORDINARIES (4.905) ......... (0.355) 
5<YEARS>10 0.829 0.109 0.340 
(4.913)* ... (0.236) 
> 10 YEARS 0.842 -0.035 0.339 
(4.971)* ... (-0.091) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.830 0.122 0.339 
(4.913),..,.,.. (0.204) 
STATEX <5 YEARS 1.011 -0.291 0.370 
(5.258) ...... ,. (-0.301) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.008 -0.124 0.370 
(5.272)*..,. (-Q.269) 
> 10 YEAP.S 1.024 -0.206 0.373 
(5.368)**• (-0.537) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.013 -0.206 0.371 
(5.282)"" .... (-Q.345) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE6 
Results of Regression Tests for NAB for the Period 01/10/86 to 16/10/87 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 0.833 2.309 0.437 
ORDINARIES (5.709)u-• (2.474)•• 
5<YEAR5> 10 0.839 0.985 0.423 
(5.039)*** (2.167)"'"" 
> lOYEARS 0.848 0.694 0.407 
(5.008)••• (1.796)"' 
ALL MA TUPJTIES 0.833 1.340 0.428 
(5.021)u• (2.281)** 
SlATEX <5YEARS 0.959 1.776 0.428 
(4.958)*""* (1.827)' 
5<YEARS> 10 0.974 0.785 0.423 
(5.040)""* ... (1.686)' 
> 10 YEARS 0.991 0.548 0.413 
(5.085) ...... * (1.396) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.965 1.063 0.426 
(4.989) ....... (1.759)' 
"'*"' p < 0.01 
•• 0.01 < p < 0.05 
• 0.05 < p < 0.10 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 7 
Results of Regression Tgsts for WBC for the Period QlL!OL86 to 16{10L87 
RE1URN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 0.699 0.910 0.345 
ORDINARIES (4.691)* .. (1.073) 
5<YEARS> 10 0.707 0.328 0.338 
(4.707) ..... (0.801} 
> 10YEARS 0.718 0.164 0.333 
(4.740)••• (0.474} 
ALL MATURITIES 0.703 0.473 0.340 
(4.683) .... (0.891} 
STATEX <SYEARS 0.750 0.554 0.300 
(4.162)"",.. (0.612} 
S<YEARS> 10 0.760 0.206 0.298 
(4.235).,.,.. (0.476} 
> IOYEARS 0.774 0.080 0.295 
(4.307) ....... (0.221) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.756 0.300 0.298 
(4.196)"' .... (0.534) 
*"'* p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent !-test results 
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TABLES 
Results of Regression Tests for Bank Accumulation Index for the Period 
01/10LB6 to 16L10LB7 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 0.698 1.223 0.421 
ORDINARIES (5.344)"'*"" (1.645) 
5<YEARS> 10 0.703 0.508 0.414 
(5.328),.,.. (1.413) 
> lOYC:ARS 0.711 0.324 0.404 
(5.329)""*"" (1.065) 
ALL MATU'UTIES 0.700 0.691 0.416 
(5.310)"" .... (1.481) 
STATEX <5YEARS 0.799 0.783 0.408 
(5.168)""...,. (1.008) 
5< YEARS> 10 0.805 0.348 0.406 
(5.232)*,.,. (0.939) 
> !OYEARS 0.818 0.209 D.401 
(5.293)*"""" (0.671) 
ALL i"ATURITIES 0.802 0.467 0.407 
(5.194)•• ... (0.967) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 9 
Results of Regression Tests for ANZ for the Period 04L03LBB to 03L03LB9 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5YEARS 1.224 -1.391 0.409 
ORDINARIES (5.874) ........ (-0.988) 
5<YEAR5>10 1.224 -0.657 0.409 
(5.881)*,.,. (-1.014) 
> 10YEARS 1.235 -0.513 0.411 
(5.901) ...... (-1.069) 
ALL MATURfTIES 1.210 -0.313 OAOO 
(5.760) ........ (-0.485) 
STATEX <5YEARS 1.152 -1.377 0.403 
(5.805)...,.,.. (-0.973) 
5< YEARS> 10 1.158 -0.699 0.405 
(5.833) ...... (-1.072) 
> lOYEARS 1.171 -0.562 0.408 
(5.865)*,.... (-1.165) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.149 -0.423 0.397 
(5.721)* ..... (-0.650) 
"'** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t~test re&ults 
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TABLE 10 
Results of Regression Tests for NAB for the Period 04L03L88 to 03L03L89 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <SYEARS 1.124 -1.250 0.356 
ORDINARIES (5.256)* ... (-0.864) 
5<YEARS>10 1.131 -0.717 0.361 
(5,308)U!t (-1.080) 
> IOYEARS 1.128 0.270 0.350 
(5.178)• ...... (-0.544) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.094 0.114 0.347 
(5,068)U"" (0.172) 
STATEX < SYEARS 1.119 -1.295 0.392 
(5.676)"' ... (-0.921) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.131 -0.785 0.400 
(5.758) ... ,. (-1.218) 
> 10YEARS 1.122 -0.343 0.388 
(5,615)U01- (-0.710) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.096 -0.818 0.382 
(5.474)**-'t (-0.027) 
...... p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 11 
Results of Regression Tests for WBC for the Period 04/03/88 to 03/03/89 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <SYEARS 1.425 -2.294 0.544 
ORDINARIES (7.686)'" (-1.830)' 
S<YEARS> 10 1.428 -1.116 0.548 
(7.733)*"'* (-1.940)"" 
> 10YEARS 1.434 -0.722 0.540 
(7.648) ........ (-1.679)* 
ALL MATURITIES 1.407 -0.599 0.524 
(7.415)** .. (-1.028) 
STATEX <SYEARS 1.315 -2.251 0.515 
(7.251)••• (-1.742)"" 
5< YEARS> 10 1.325 -1.151 0.522 
(7.341)*.,. (-1.944)"" 
> 10 YEARS 1.334 -0.766 0.515 
(7.279)*** (-1.730)"" 
ALL MATURITIES 1.311 -0.712 0.500 
(7.070)* ..... (-1.186) 
*"'"' p < 0.01 
• 0.05 < p < 0.10 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 12 
Results of Regression Tests for Bank Accumulation Index for the Period 
04/03/88 to 03/03/89 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 1.250 -1.853 0.632 
ORDINARIES (9.244)"',.,. (-2.027)""• 
5 <YEARS> 10 1.251 -o.855 0.633 
(9,248)>1-U (-2,QJ])U 
> 10 YEARS 1.255 -Q.S51 0.625 
(9.132)*U H.749)* 
ALL MATURITIES 1.224 -D.234 0.605 
(8.711)*** (-0.542) 
STATEX < 5 YEARS 1.182 -1.843 0.628 
(9.155) ........ (-2.003) ... 
5<YEARS> 10 1.188 -0.900 0.632 
(9.228)* .... (-2.131)** 
> 10YEARS 1.195 -0.603 0.625 
(9.135)*** (-1.908)"' 
ALL MATURITIES 1.165 -0.346 0.603 
(8.685)'.. (-0.797) 
*** p < 0.01 
•• 0.01 < p < 0.05 
• 0.05 < p < 0.10 
Note. Figures in brackets represent Hest results 
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TABLE 13 
Results of Regression Tests for ANZ for the Period 10L03L89 to 09L03L90 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
-
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < SYEARS 0.967 -0.802 0.289 
ORDINARIES (4.505)'"" .. (-0.813) 
5 <YEARS> 10 0.986 -0.566 0.294 
(4.565)"" ..... (-1.025) 
> IOYEARS 0.983 -0.247 0.292 
(4.540)* .... (-0.951) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.983 -0.721 0.294 
(4.563)"" ..... (-1.016) 
STATEX <5YEARS 0.897 -0.639 0.258 
(4.169)**"" (-0.638) 
5< YEARS> 10 0.921 -0.521 0.265 
(4.241)"'** (-0.925) 
> 10 YEARS 0.907 -0.193 0.260 
(4.187)* .... (-0.732) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.915 -0.644 0.264 
(4.232) ........ (-0.892) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 14 
Results of Regression Tests for NAB for the Period 10[03[89 to 09[03[20 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5 YEARS 0.965 -0.354 0.352 
ORDINARIES (5.174)"" ..... (-0.413) 
5 <YEARS> 10 0.982 -0.34B 0.357 
(5.235)*,.,. (-0.724) 
> 10 YEARS 0.993 -0.210 0.361 
(5.302) ........ (-0.937) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.980 -0.445 0.357 
(5.241)* .... (-0.722) 
STATEX < 5YEARS 0.901 -0.196 0.320 
(4.807)11-H (-0.225) 
5< YEARS> 10 0.922 -0.305 0.324 
(4.867)""""* (-0.621) 
> IOYEARS 0.922 -0.157 0.325 
(4.896)*U (-0.687) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.918 -0.372 0.324 
(4.867)*,.,. (-0.590) 
"'** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent !-test results 
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TABLE 15 
Results of Regression Tests for WBC for the Period 10/03/89 to 09/03/90 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < SYEARS 1.020 1.903 0.358 
ORDINARIES (4.493)""*"" (1.825)' 
5<YEARS>IO 1.042 0.643 0.331 
(4.452)*""* (1.073) 
> IOYEARS 1.070 0.157 0.319 
(4.530)"" ..... (O.S55) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.038 0.925 0.335 
(4.463)"' ..... (1.207) 
STATEX < 5 YEARS 0.891 2.119 0.304 
(3.844) ..... "" (1.962)' 
5< YEARS> 10 0.903 0.733 0.271 
(3.755)"" .... (1.175) 
> IOYEARS 0.929 0.232 0.260 
(3.854)*,.,. (0.789) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.901 1.054 0.276 
(3.777)*"'* (1.322) 
*** p < 0.01 
• 0.05 < p < 0.10 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 1.6 
Results of Regression Tests for Bank Accumulation Index for the Period 
10L03L89 to 09L03L90 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC r<SQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUiTY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 0.935 0.412 0.484 
ORDINARIES (6.561)* .... (0.629) 
S<YEARS> 10 0.954 -0.010 0.480 
(6.602)""...,. (·0.027) 
> 10YEARS 0.961 ·0.039 0.481 
(6.646)*...,. (·0.223) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.953 0.005 0.693 
(6.613)*""* (0.010) 
STATEX <SYEARS 0.832 0.598 0.405 
(5.538) ........ (0.855) 
5<YEARS > 10 0.848 0.060 0.397 
(5.535)*""* (0.151) 
> IOYEARS 0.850 0.024 0.397 
(5.573) ....... (0.128) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.847 0.109 0.397 
(5.550)*** (0.213) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 17 
Results of Regression Tests for ANZ fQr the Period 16L03L90 to 15L03L91 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 1.133 -0.366 0.325 
ORDINARIES (4.884) ........ (.0.196) 
5 <YEARS> 10 1.122 0.264 0.326 
(4,78Q)H* (0.356) 
> !OYEARS 1.131 0.079 0.325 
(4.854)"'** (0.171) 
-ALL MATURITIES 1.130 0.249 0.325 
(4.854) .... * (0.219) 
STATEX <SYEARS 1.018 0.054 0.258 
(4.153)* ..... (0.027) 
5<YEARS > 10 1.000 0.530 0.265 
(4.105)*** (0.691) 
> !OYEARS 1.011 0.206 0.261 
(4.152)"'** (1).430) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.013 0.548 0.263 
(4.169) ....... (0.548) 
*** p < 0.01 
NJte. Figures in brackets represent t~test results 
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TABLE 18 
Results of Regression Tests for NAB for the Period 16L03L90 to 15L03L91 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUI1Y MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUI1Y DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 1.007 -0.053 0.356 
ORDINARIES (5.247)*** (-0.035) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.004 0.069 0.356 
(5.167),.,.,. (0.113) 
> 10YEARS 1.006 0.024 0.356 
(5.220)"' ..... (0.064) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.006 0.077 0.356 
(5.222)*,.,. (0.081) 
STATEX < 5 fEARS 0.965 0.372 0.322 
(4.861)*** (0.234) 
5< YEARS> 10 0.951 0.290 0.324 
(4.801)"" .... (0.465) 
> !OYEARS 0.956 0.131 0.322 
(4.841)*11-11- (0.338) 
ALL MATURITIES 0.958 0.425 0.324 
(4.855)* .... (0.442) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 19 
Results of Regression Tests for WBC for tl!e Period 16L03L90 to 15L03L91 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUI1Y DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5 YEARS 1.171 0.898 0.383 
ORDINARIES (5.560)..,.. ... (0.530) 
5 <YEARS> 10 1.127 0.756 0.395 
(5.335)*** (1.134) 
> 10YEARS 1.144 0.403 0.391 
(5.443)*,.... (0.974) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.144 1.049 0.392 
(5.453)*** (1.023) 
STATEX < 5YEARS 1.093 1.367 0.328 
(4.936),.,. .. (0.770) 
5< YEARS> 10 1.043 1.011 0.348 
(4.786)*""* (1.474) 
> 10 YEARS 1.060 0.528 0.340 
(4.851)*** (1.299) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.066 1.448 0.345 
(4.900)"'*"" (1.366) 
*'* p < O.Ql 
Note. Figures in brackets represent !-test results 
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TABLE 20 
Results of Regression Tests for Bank Accumulation Index for the Period 
16L03L90 to 15L03L91 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5 YEARS 1.143 0.345 0.615 
ORDINARIES (8.937)>1-U (0.336) 
5 <YEARS> 10 1.123 0.351 0.620 
(8.726)>1-U (0.862) 
> 10 YEARS 1.131 0.186 0.618 
(8.842) ...... (0.737) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.131 0.472 0.619 
(8.853} .. ..,. (0.755) 
STATEX < 5 YEARS 1.081 0.815 0.541 
(7.680) ....... (0.723) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.051 0.601 0.553 
(7.575)*** (1.376) 
> 10YEARS 1.061 0.307 0.548 
(7.630)*** (1.124) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.065 0.865 0.551 
(7.690)*** (1.282) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 21 
Results of Regression Tests for ANZ for the Period 22!03!91 to 27 L03L92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MAEKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5 YEARS 1.367 1.276 0.333 
ORDINARIES (4.844)...,.,.. (1.143) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.357 0.462 0.325 
(4,7~9)*U (0.811) 
> 10YEARS 1.370 0.239 0.320 
(4.790)"' .... (0.566) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.357 0.836 0.331 
(4.784)"" .... (1.071) 
STATEX < S YEARS 1.374 1.102 0.326 
(4.760)...,.,. (0.979) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.369 0.424 0.320 
(4.700)* .... (0.740) 
> 10 YEARS 1.383 0.214 0.317 
(4.748)*** (0.530) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.366 0.762 0.326 
(4.72])>~-~~-.• (0.970) 
*** p < 0.01 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 22 
Results of Regression Tests for NAB for the Period 22/03/91 to 27/03/92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5 YEARS 0.957 1.625 0.459 
ORDINARIES (5.911)*•• (2.539)...,. 
5 <YEARS>lO 0.931 0.795 0.454 
(5.692)•.+• (2.439) ...... 
>tO YEARS 0.949 0.458 0.429 
(5,691)11-U (1.857)* 
ALL MATURITIES 0.938 1.209 0.468 
(5.828) ..... (2.729)"" .... 
STATEX < SYEARS 0.900 1.524 0.405 
(5,217)*U (2,266)*"" 
5< YEARS> 10 0.880 0.785 0.407 
(5.081)••• (2.306)*"" 
> 10 YEARS 0.900 0.449 0.382 
(5.111)*,.,. (1.750)* 
ALL MATURITIES 0.885 1.176 0.419 
(5.173)** .. (2.535)"""" 
*** p < 0.01 
•• 0.01 < p < 0.05 
• 0.05 < p < 0.10 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 23 
Results of Regression Tests for WBC for the Period 22L03L91 to 27 L03L92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL < 5 YEARS 1.331 -0.236 0.398 
ORDINARIES (5,812)*H (-0.261) 
5 <YEARS> 10 1.365 -0.594 0.417 
(6.017)*** (-1.314) 
> IOYEARS 1.356 -0.426 0.416 
(5.991) ........ (-1.271) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.349 -o.612 0.409 
(5.923)*** (-0.977) 
STATEX < 5 YEARS 1.209 -0.361 0.318 
(4.874)*** (-0.374) 
5<YEARS> 10 1.242 -0.596 0.336 
(5.048) ......... (-1.232) 
> W YEARS 1.234 -0.429 0.335 
(5.025)*,.,. (-1.199) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.228 -0.645 0.328 
(4.976)*** (-0.96.3) 
'** p < O.Ql 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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TABLE 24 
Results of Regression Tests for Bank Accumulation Index for the Period 
22L03L91 to 27 L03L92 
RETURN FROM THE SYSTEMATIC RSQD 
EQUITY MARKET DEBT MARKET EQUITY DEBT VALUE 
ALL <5YEARS 1.119 0.894 0.636 
ORDINARIES (9.146}~** (1.849)' 
5<YEARS> 10 1.118 0.224 0.618 
(8.861)"" ..... (0.890) 
> 10 YEARS 1.124 0.119 0.615 
(8.891)~*-'~- (0.637) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.116 0.457 0.625 
(8.958)* ..... (1.334) 
STATEX <5YEARS 1.031 0.784 0530 
(7.288) ....... (1.422) 
S< YEARS> 10 1.034 0.218 0.517 
(7 .169)* ..... (0.768) 
> IOYEARS 1.040 0.113 0.514 
(7.217)* ..... (0.538) 
ALL MATURITIES 1.031 0.426 0.522 
(7.211)*** (1.098) 
*** p < 0.01 
• 0.05 < p < 0.10 
Note. Figures in brackets represent t-test results 
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Table 25 
Summary of Significant Systematic Interest Rate Risk Coefficients 
SIGNIFICANT 0-SYRS 5-lOYRS TOlOYRS ALLMAT AVE 
BANK 1Uf + - NO. AVE NO. AVE NO. AVE NO. AVE RSQ 
ANZ 0 0 0 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0.34 
NAB 23 23 0 6 1.62 6 0.76 5 0.44 6 0.84 0.38 
WBC 9 3 6 4 2.14 2 1.13 2 0.74 0 NA 0.40 
BANK INDEX 8 2 6 5 1.68 2 0.88 2 0.57 0 NA 0.55 
TOTAL/AVE 40 28 12 15 1.78 10 0.86 9 0.54 6 0.84 0.42 
Note. '+'indicates a positive value for the systematic interest rate risk 
value. '-' indicates a negative value for the systematic interest rate risk value. 
'NO.' indicates the number of significant systematic interest rate risk values. 
'AVE' indicates the average score of the significant systematic interest rate risk 
values. When calculating this only the absolute values v;rr.m~ considered (that is 
negative values were treated as positive values). 'NA' indk:ates no average was 
calculated as no significant scores were found. 
Significant means any systematic interest rate risk value that is s.l,gnificant at the 
1, 5 or 10% level. The total number of regressions for each bank was 48. The 
total nwnber of regressions overall was 192. 
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Appendix B 
Analyst Questionnaire 
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SURVEY OF BANKING ANALYSTS 
THE INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY OF RETURNS ON BANK SHARES 
This study attempts to analyse the interest rate sensitivity of returns on bank shares. 
The study involves two separate areas of work. The first area of work largely 
involves statistical analysis. Share price and interest rate data for the period October 
1986 to March 1992 will be analysed to determine whether or not a significant 
relationship exists. The result will give an indication of the strength and direction 
of the relationship ; also whether or not it was stable over the period being analysed 
; and how the relationship has varied from bank to bank. 
The second area involves understanding why there is (if at all) a relationship 
between interest rate changes and returns on a bank share. Putting it another way, 
why do changes in interest rates cause changes in the returns from bank shares?. 
While there are a number of possible theoretical explanations for this relationship, 
the focus in this study is to determine how the market understands the relationship. 
1\anking analysts are, in many ways, opinion leaders in the market for bank shares. 
hCcordingly they are a logical group for this study to survey on how they 
understand the cause and effed of this relationship. To this end the following 
survey questionnaire has been d1~vised. 
BROKER 
FIRM: 
DATE: 
TIME: 
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SECTIONl 
QUESTIONS ON BANKS GENERALLY 
1. In your work as a banking analyst, do you feel that there is a relationship between 
interest rate changes and returns on bank shares (as measured by the Banks 
Australian Accumulation Index). 
COMMENTS : 
YES 
NO 
2. (If you answered yes to question 1) Do you feel interest rate changes have: 
NO EFFECT 
1 
COMMENTS 
SOME EFFECT 
2 3 
3. Do you feel this relationship is 
COMMENTS 
88 
LARGE EFFECT 
4 5 
DIRECT 
INVERSE 
4. Do you feel that this relationship, has been stable since October 1986 ? 
COMMENTS : 
5. Tn summary then, you have indicated that you feel the relationship between 
interest rate changes and bank share returns is WEAK/MEDIUM/STRONG and 
DIRECT/INVERSE and STABLE/UNSTABLE. 
,'a) What do you think are the important factors in determining this relationship: 
COMMENTS : 
(b) How important do you think the following considerations are in determining 
this relationship : 
(i) Duration effects 
UNIMPORTANT 
1 
COMMENTS : 
2 
IMPORTANT 
3 4 
89 
VERY IMPORTANT 
5 
(ii) Maturity effects 
UNIMPORTANT 
1 2 
COMMENTS 
(iii) Rate of default on loans 
UNIMPORTANT 
1 
COMMENTS 
2 
IMPO"TANT 
3 4 
IMPORTANT 
3 4 
(iv) Interest rate margiLs between assets and liabilities 
UN!MPORTANT IMPORTANT 
1 2 3 4 
COMMENTS 
VERY IMPORT ANT 
5 
VERY IMPORTANT 
5 
VERY IMPORTANT 
5 
6. You have already indicated that you feel that the general relationship between 
interest rate changes and bank share retums is WEAK/MEDIUM/STRONG and 
DIRECT /INVERSE and STABLE/UNSTABLE. Do you see that relationship being 
different from one bank to another (e.g. for the major ANZ, Westpac, National and 
C01Jll-,1nnwealth banks). 
90 
YES 
NO 
SECTION2 
QUESTIONS ON BANKS INDIVIDUALLY 
1. (If yes to question 6 in Section 1) For which banks do you see the relationship 
being different ? -----------------------------------------------
2. ANZ 
(a) How different ? 
COMMENTS : 
YES/NO 
WEAK/MEDIUM/STRONG 
DIRECT /INDIRECT 
STABLE/NOT STABLE 
(b) Why do you think there are differences for the ANZ Bank ? 
3. NATIONAL 
(a) How different ? 
COMMENTS : 
YES/NO 
WEAK/MEDIUM/STRONG 
DIRECT /INDIRECT 
STAtlLE/NOT STABLE 
91 
(b) Why do you think there are differences for the National Bank? 
4. WESTPAC 
(a) How different ? 
COMMENTS : 
YES/NO 
WEAK/MEDIUM/STRONG 
DIRECT /INDIRECT 
STABLE/NOT STABLE 
(b) Why do you think there are differences for Westpac Bank? 
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Appendix C 
Survey Responses 
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Table 26 
The Responses of Whether the Relationship Between Interest Rate Changes and 
Returns on Bank Shares Exists 
Table 27 
RESPONSES 
YES 
NO 
NUMBER 
15 
0 
PERCENTAGE 
100 
0 
Responses as to the Effect Interest Rate Changes Have on Bank Shares Returns 
DEGREE NO SOME LARGE 
OFEFFECf EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT 
RESPONSES 1 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 
NUMBER' 0 2 1 6 1 3 1 
PERCENTAGE 0 14 7 43 7 22 7 
Note. • Ooe analyst responded that interest rates had a large effect (5) in the 
short term, and no effect (1) in the long term. 
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Table 28 
Responses as to the Direction of the Relationship Between Il\terest Rate Changes 
and Returns on Bank Shares 
RESPONSES 
DIRECT 
INVERSE 
NUMBER • 
0 
13 
PERCENTAGE 
0 
100 
Note. *Two analysts responses were that the direction of the relationship had 
changed over time 
Table 29 
Responses as to the Stability of the Relationship Since October 1986 
RESPONSES 
STABLE 
UNSTABLE 
NUMBER 
2 
13 
95 
PERCENTAGE 
13 
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Table 30 
Responses as to the Importance of Duration Effects in DetP-rmining the 
Relationship betw"een Interest Rate Changes and Bank Shares Returns 
DEGREE OF VERY 
IMPORTANCE UNIMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
RESPONSES 1 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 
NUMBER* 4 3 1 2 1 2 0 
PERCENTAGE 31 23 8 15 8 15 0 
Note. • One response felt the relationship was unimportant (1) in the short term 
and ver important (4) in the long term. 
Table 31 
Responses as to the Importance of Maturity Effects in Det~rmining the 
Relationship between Interest Rate Changes and Bank Shares Returns 
DEGREE OF VERY 
IMPORTANCE UNIMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMI-ORTAt-... 7 
RESPONSES 1 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 
NUMBER* 3 3 1 3 1 3 0 
PERCENTAGE 21 21 7 21 7 21 0 
Note. * One response felt the relationship was unimportant (1) in the short term 
and ver important (4) in the long term. 
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Table 32 
Responses as to the Importance of Rate of Default on Loans Effect in 
De-termining the Relationship between Interest Rate Changes and Bank Shares 
Returns 
DEGREE OF VERY 
IMPORTANCE UNIMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
RESPONSES 1 1.5 2 3 3.5 4 5 
NUMBER 1 1 3 2 0 3 5 
PERCENTAGE 7 7 20 12 0 20 33 
Table 33 
ResPonses as to the Importance of Interest Rate Margins Between Assets and 
Liabilities Effects in Determining the Relationship between Interest Rate 
Changes and Bank Shares Returns 
DEGREE OF VERY 
IMPORTANCE UNIMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
RESPONSES 1 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 5 
NUMBER 2 1 0 3 1 5 3 
PERCENTAGE 13 7 0 20 7 33 20 
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Table 34 
Responses as to Whether General Relationship is Different From One Bank to 
Another (for the major ANZ, NAB & WBC banks) 
Table 35 
RESPONSES 
YES 
NO 
NUMBER 
14 
1 
PERCENTAGE 
93 
7 
Response as to Which Banks Share Returns Relationship With Interest Rate 
Changes was Different with The General Relationship 
RESPONSES NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
ALL BANKS 6 40 
ANZ&WBC 4 27 
NAB 2 13 
SMALL CHANGE ' 2 13 
NO CHANGE 1 7 
Note. 'These analysts felt that the relationship was not strong anyway and any 
difference would not be worth mentioning. 
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Table 36 
Responses as to the Differences in the ANZ From the General Relationship. 
RESPONSES 
NO CHANGE 
WEAKER' 
STRONGER 
MORE UNSTABLE 
NUMBER 
5 
7 
1 
2 
PERCENTAGE 
33 
47 
7 
13 
Note. ''One response said the relationship was weaker since the recession 
Table 37 
Responses as to the Differences in the NAB From the General Relationship. 
RESPONSES 
NO CHANGE 
WEAKER 
STRONGER 
STABLE ' 
NUMBER 
7 
1 
5 
2 
PERCENTAGE 
46 
7 
33 
13 
Note. 'One response said the relationship was both stronger and more stable. 
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Table 38 
Responses as to the Differences in the WBC From the General Reiationship 
RESPONSES 
NO CHANGE 
WEAKER* 
STRONGER 
MORE UNSTABLE 
NUMBER 
5 
7 
1 
2 
PERCENTAGE 
33 
47 
7 
13 
Note. *One response was that the relationship was weaker since the recession. 
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